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MODERN ENVIRONMENTALISTS OVERREACH: A
PLEA FOR UNDERSTANDING BACKGROUND
COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN'
One of the major issues of our time involves the institutional
arrangements that should be introduced in response to damage
caused by various forms of pollution. In dealing with this issue,
there is widespread agreement that pollution from natural
sources is a risk to be controlled, and that pollution from hu-
man sources creates dangers that are the proper subject of legal
constraint, be it by government regulation, state or federal, or
by private rights of action under either federal or state law,
brought individually or by classes. Any supposed laissez-faire
regime that would leave the question of pollution to the "mar-
ket" is no more plausible than a laissez-faire regime that as-
sumes that the state need not supply some remedy against oth-
er forms of aggression that one individual takes against the rest
of the world. The only question here is that of technique, which
leads those interested to worry about two primary issues. The
first involves the proper analytical framework to deal with en-
vironmental issues. And the second deals with the distinctive
treatment of some specific issues in environmental law. In both
areas, it is critical to be attentive to the incentives that the rules
create for opportunistic behavior on all sides, the risks of over-
and under-enforcement of environmental safeguards, and the
administrative costs of putting any complex regulatory scheme
into place.
* Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, The
Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, and the James
Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, The
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The level of choice raised by these issues is not inconsidera-
ble. In particular, this Essay presents extensive differences with
Professor Blais's argument' that extend to virtually every point
of institutional design outside her general condemnation of
pollution as a species of harmful conduct.2 Before responding
to these issues directly, the first Part of this Essay puts the
common law framework into perspective and analyzes the role
that a correct understanding of both the just compensation
principle and the harm principle plays in the overall analysis.
Thereafter, the second Part addresses three particular issues:
the use of injunctions, the role of knowledge as a form of as-
sumption of risk, and the dangers of environmental exactions.
I. BASIC FRAMEWORK
A. The Common Law Approach
The major intellectual challenge in this area is whether it is
possible to organize a system of property rights that deals with
the larger question of pollution that outperforms the articula-
tion of the common-law rules, as they apply to both public and
private nuisances.3 The answer to that question is that the law
cannot do better. Therefore, the function of the federal or state
governments in these issues ought not to be, in effect, to create
a brave new world of weird and uncertain entitlements. Envi-
ronmental entitlements, such as those that have been created
for dealing with wetlands or endangered species, list the
preservation of habitat as a nuisance and pollution issue rather
than a takings issue, which is how it ought to be classified. Le-
gal modesty should be the order of the day. The role of gov-
ernment at all levels should be to improve the enforcement of
the set of entitlements already in place by using collective en-
forcement actions when the disorganized actions of private in-
dividuals are insufficient to deal with pollution risks.
1. Lynn E. Blais, The Legitimate Reach of the Environmental Revolution, 37 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 13 (2014).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is the Common Law the Solution to Pollution, PROP. EN-
VTL. REs. Cm. (Nov. 1, 2011), http://perc.org/articles/common-law-solution-pollution.
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One way to make the point is to turn for a moment to the fa-
mous fire on the Cuyahoga River in Ohio in 1969.4 The fire was
caused by an oil slick in severely polluted water and caused tens
of thousands of dollars worth of damage.5 The source of the evi-
dent institutional breakdown that led to this dramatic event is as
follows: The local governments, often subject to political pres-
sure by their major industrial constituents, did not enforce the
standard legal rules, set in place to deal with the private creation
of public nuisances. 6 The lax enforcement of these rules led to
private parties treating valuable public resources as a useless
dump in which they could deposit their waste without limit and
resulted in private gain at public expense.7 This situation thus
replicates the standard prisoner's dilemma game:' All polluters
are better off without the pollution, but none unilaterally will
stop so long as others can pollute. The appropriate response to
this breakdown in social responsibility is not to pass some new
huge, unwieldy, and overambitious law. Rather, it is to ramp up
effective state enforcement, conferring, if necessary, standing on
private individuals who use the rivers to coerce public bodies to
take steps to clean up the river.9 On that model, the only hard
question is how far to push the cleanup agenda, and on this
point I believe that many strong environmentalists, including
Professor Blais, go wrong.
The private law of nuisance contains, of course, a strong pro-
hibition against pollution of neighboring properties and public
waters. 0 Yet that basic regime of strict liability is also offset by
a de minimis or a live-and-let-live rule," which says, roughly
4. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History
of Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89 (2002).
5. See Kristi Umbreit, Cleveland Marks 20th Anniversary of River Fire, AP NEWS
ARCHIVE (June 22, 1989), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1989/Cleveland-Marks-
20th-Anniversary-of-River-Fire/id-1903c96b7dc542d43f57b4d96e903883.
6. See Adler, supra note 4, at 101-05.
7. Id.
8. See generally ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DI-
LEMMA (1965).
9. Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending- The Role of Legal and Equitable
Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2001).
10. See, e.g., Mayor of Rockaway v. Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. 1039,
1057-58 (D.N.J. 1993); Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.).
11. See, e.g., The King v. Tindall, (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 55, 6 Ad. & El. 143 (finding
no public nuisance when harbor "in some extreme cases rendered less secure");
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speaking, that once the state has gotten rid of ninety-nine per-
cent of the pollution at any particular site, and received in ex-
change a large net benefit, it adheres to the economic law of
diminishing marginal utility, and resists any temptation to
double down on expenditures and thus drive pollution levels
to zero.12 Knowing when to quit is as important as knowing
when to proceed. Any support for creating a pollution-free riv-
er fails if it overlooks the need to set marginal benefit equal to
marginal cost.'3 In so doing, advocates of a pollution-free posi-
tion have gone a bridge too far by inventing problems that
need no solution. Now the environmentalists themselves be-
come the social problem.
B. The Compensation Principle
These dangers can be avoided. Those who say "either we do
everything, or it is as though we have done nothing," have de-
viated from a principle that was best articulated by one of the
most prominent of the 19th century English libertarian judges,
Baron George Bramwell.14 In his great decision in Bamford v.
Turnley,s Judge Bramwell explicitly related the law of nuisance
to modern accounts of social welfare years before these were
formalized. He wrote:
The public consists of all the individuals of it, and a thing is
only for the public benefit when it is productive of good to
those individuals on the balance of loss and gain to all. So
that if all the loss and all the gain were borne and received
by one individual, he on the whole would be a gainer. But
whenever this is the case, -whenever a thing is for the pub-
lic benefit, properly understood, -the loss to the individuals
of the public who lose will bear compensation out of the
Taylor v. Bennett, (1836) 173 Eng. Rep. 146, 7 C. & P. 329 (temporary muddying of
a well). For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and
Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 82-87 (1979).
12. See Richard A. Epstein, Regulation-and Contract-in Environmental Law, 93
W. VA. L. REV. 859, 875-76 (1991).
13. See generally Terry L. Anderson, Markets and the Environment: Friends or Foes?,
55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81 (2004).
14. Richard A. Epstein, Introduction: Baron Bramwell at the End of the Twentieth
Century, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 241, 243-44 (1994) (providing an overview of the
intellectual development of Baron Bramwell).
15. (1862) 122 Eng. Rep. 27.
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gains of those who gain. It is for the public benefit there
should be railways, but it would not be unless the gain of
having the railway was sufficient to compensate the loss oc-
casioned by the use of the land required for its site; and ac-
cordingly no one thinks it would be right to take an individ-
ual's land without compensation to make a railway. 6
In making this general statement, Judge Bramwell showed a
deep awareness of the just compensation principle, which all
too often is shunted aside today, even though it functions ex-
actly as Bramwell envisions: It is a financial constraint on gov-
ernment that does not allow one person to impress his will on
others without paying the just freight.17 It is for that reason that
he takes into account the interests of all persons, not just those
who benefit from the improvement, which makes his articula-
tion of the principle a worthy forerunner to the development of
the Paretian formulas around 190018 and the Kaldor-Hicks for-
mula (or hypothetical compensation formula) some forty years
later.19 One sense of the strength of the common-law system of
16. Id. at 33.
17. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
18. Pareto optimality is a state of resource allocation in which it is impossible to
make any one individual better off without making at least one individual worse
off. See Gerard Debreu, Valuation Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum, 40 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 588, 588 (1954); Amartya Sen, Markets and Freedoms: Achievements
and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms, 45 Oxford
Econ. Papers 519, 520-21 (1993). The phrase is named after Vilfredo Pareto, an
Italian economist who developed the concept in his book, Manual of Political Econ-
omy. Pareto Optimality, POLICONOMICS, http://www.policonomics.com/pareto-
optimal/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2013). When resources are initially allocated among a
group of individuals, a change in the allocation that makes at least one individual
better off without making any other individual worse off is called a Pareto im-
provement. See Debreu, supra, at 588-92; Pareto Optimality, supra. An allocation is
Pareto optimal when no further Pareto improvements can be made, meaning that
there is no possibility of redistribution in a way where at least one individual
would be better off while no other individual ends up worse off. See Debreu, su-
pra, at 588-92; Pareto Optimality, supra. For its application to eminent domain, see
EPSTEIN, supra note 17, at 8, 200-01.
19. The Kaldor-Hicks requirement is generally regarded as less stringent than
the Paretian requirement because it only requires that one party be able in princi-
ple to pay compensation to a second in ways that would leave them both at least
as well off as before, so that Pareto improvements are properly regarded as a sub-
set of Kaldor-Hicks improvement whereby both parties are better off. See J.R.
Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 700-03 (1939); Nicho-
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entitlements is that it tends to generate strong Pareto efficient
outcomes from the ex ante perspective. 20
To show the common law's efficiency, it is important to illus-
trate how this system of private rights works. Exclusive posses-
sion means, among other things, the protection against inva-
sion by pollutants from other sources, subject to the constraint
that de minimis or low level interferences are not to be en-
joined. 21 In those cases where there are reciprocal damages
among two or more parties, no action need be allowed at all,
because each person is compensated for the loss of some envi-
ronmental purity by his or her own greater freedom of actions.
C. The Harm Principle
In making this argument, it is critical not to include other
supposed harms in the analysis. Indeed, one of the terrible in-
tellectual mistakes of the environmental movement is to ex-
pand the definition of "harm" so that it rejects the common-law
distinction between those harms that are cognizable by legal
action and those harms that are properly treated as damnum
absque injuria.2 2 The basic argument that one wants to make
about this is as follows: There are all sorts of things that can
happen to anyone that leave him worse off than he was before.
But once we understand how these particular harms fit into a
larger calculus of social interaction, the last thing we want to
do is to make them actionable for the simple reason that there
is a perfect negative correlation between the particular private
social loss and overall social gain.
las Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,
49 ECON. J. 549, 550 (1939).
20. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 17 (1987).
21. Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Prods and Pleas: A Defense of the Conventional
Views on Tort and Administrative Law in the Context of Global Warming, 121 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 317, 321 (2011).
22. See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d
357, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 1959), Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in
Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 1025-27
(1982) (explaining the theory of damnum absque injuria). For a general account of
the dangers of expanding the harm principle, see Richard A. Epstein, The Harm
Principle-and How It Grew, 45 U. TORONTO L.J. 369 (1995).
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Two famous illustrations demonstrate this point. First, com-
petition always hurts competitors who are less fortunate or
nimble in any given market. But that grim fact does not mean
we ought to enact a law of fair competition so that people can-
not enter with new products or undersell established parties.23
Second, one cannot say by virtue of the fact that his neighbor
has built the same house on his land that he has built on his
own, that by blocking his view the neighbor has committed a
harm that ought to be regarded as actionable. If one takes that
premise seriously, there will be no development at all. The first
person of two nearby neighbors would never be allowed to
build anything at all because that would necessarily inhibit the
right of the neighbor, whose view is blocked, to build.24 These
sequential issues must be understood if we are to make sure
that environmental law, like nuisance law, does not just look at
snapshots of party interactions, but explicitly accounts for the
temporal dimension. On that premise, the correct question is to
ask whether, within the confines of nuisance law, allowing
both homes or neither home is the appropriate approach. If the
effort is to maximize the value of the joint properties, the clear
choice is that it is better to let both build than neither. Blocking
of views both ways is a critical part of that system. If that allo-
cation does not work, it should be possible to vary it by con-
tract, which is often the approach when large numbers of near-
by units are part of a single planned development.25
Yet this principle is systematically violated when environ-
mentalists argue, either under some false analogy to common-
law principles or under expansive modern statutory notions,
that current landowners are in possession of some protective-
view shed, and the absurdities abound. Someone says, "You
know, he wants to build a model home on the other side of the
hill, and the mere fact that he is building it is sufficient stress to
me that I ought to be able to protest and to stop this particular
23. See Richard A. Epstein, Labor Unions: Saviors or Scourges?, 41 CAP. U. L. REV.
1, 9-10 (2013).
24. Mohr v. Midas Realty Corp., 431 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Iowa 1988) ("Because
every new construction project is bound to block someone's view of something,
every landowner would be open to a claim of nuisance.").
25. See, e.g., McCartney v. Schuette, 54 N.W.2d 462, 463 (Iowa 1952).
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application." Claims like that have been asserted, 26 and they
completely unbalance any sensible system of land use devel-
opment. Many people can profess to that unique sensibility,
but the social losses are large when one person can hold up a
development that stands to benefit many others by such a
complaint. There is no halfway house on these issues. The par-
ties who wish to establish this extensive view of self are bound
to condemn the view-shed interest on payment of just compen-
sation, just as Judge Bramwell had it in 1862.27 It is not permis-
sible to expand the definition of what counts as an actionable
harm by passing some federal or state statute that reverses the
common-law understanding on this critical point. Unfortunate-
ly, that bull-in-the-china-shop approach is now a standard part
of the environmental playbook. That action is still highly coun-
terproductive as a matter of first principle. Being adopted by
Congress or the States does not make it more palatable. Indeed,
once just compensation is required, these demands disappear
like winter snow in summer heat because the ability to exag-
gerate by cheap talk is ended.
Given this analytical framework, Professor Blais, for exam-
ple, is correct to note that the Takings Clause applies to envi-
ronmental issues,28 but she is utterly confused in how that
Clause applies when she limits its application to cases where
one person is singled out for special treatment.29 The command
of the Takings Clause -"nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation" 30-neither says nor im-
plies that if the state does not single out, it can subject any sub-
set of citizens to whatever land use restrictions it wishes to im-
pose. Under the standard doctrine of torts, if someone runs
down another person, we say it is a tort. But if that person runs
a light and kills everyone on a bus, no one says, "Well, this mis-
fortune is something that has happened to everybody; there-
fore, nobody ought to mind because these losses cancel out in
the wash." The wrongs in the bus case do not cancel out to ze-
26. See, e.g., Mohr, 431 N.W.2d at 381-83.
27. Bamford v. Turnley, (1862) 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33.
28. See Blais, supra note 1, at 20-22.
29. See id. at 21-22.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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ro. Rather, consequences are magnified. So, if that driver had
saved all his passengers, the outcome would be a gigantic plus.
When the bus crashes, however, the losses cumulate so that the
outcome becomes a disaster.
Once this point is forgotten, there are no firm limits on the
scope of the harm principle that parallel those limitations
found in the common-law area. This process was demonstrated
in the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the En-
dangered Species Act (ESA)31 in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon.32 The Supreme Court treated
the destruction of habitat on private property as a form of
"harm" to species that can be redressed without compensa-
tion.33 That decision encourages exactly the wrong type of ag-
gressive land use regulation. By expanding the harm principle,
the government is incentivized to pay no heed to the private
losses its activity generates.
The ESA contains first a list of "prohibited acts" in Section
9(a) that makes it "unlawful for any person [to] ... take any
such species within the United States or the territorial sea of the
United States."3 The statutory definition of "take" means "to
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."3 5 Thereaf-
ter, the regulations expanded the reach of the statute with the
promulgation of this rule: "Harm in the definition of 'take' in
the Act means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife.
Such act [sic] may include significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by signifi-
cantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breed-
ing, feeding, or sheltering."3 6 One serious difficulty with this
definition is that it marginalizes the role of Section 5 of the
ESA, which speaks about land acquisition by "purchase, dona-
tion, or otherwise."37 If one applies the broad definition of
31. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1351-44 (2006)).
32. 515 U.S. 687 (1995); see also Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapters
of Oregon: The Law and Economics ofHabitat Preservation, 5 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 1 (1996).
33. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 702, 708.
34. § 9(a), 83 Stat. at 893-94 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
36. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
37. § 5(a), 83 Stat. at 889 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(2)).
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harm, the government can designate habitat under the broad
definitions of "take" and "harm" which occupy the field. Jus-
tice Stevens claims that Section 5 is not a dead letter because
there are occasions where the government would prefer to take
land immediately without waiting for the occurrence of some
harm.38 But so long as any threatened harm (or even one single
instance of harm) can trigger the finding of a prohibited act
under Section 9, the number of instances where that option will
be needed is small. Indeed, the true risk in this case is that the
government will rarely make the private calculation that it
should pay full market price for extensive habitat when it can
finesse the situation and get virtually all that it wants by mak-
ing habitat designations. Yet at no point in his defense of the
broad rendering of the ESA does Justice Stevens ever address
the central problem of government abuse. Indeed, he neatly
avoids the problem by appealing to the notion of Chevron def-
erence to avoid having to make any more thorough investiga-
tion of the issue,39 as is so often the case.
This opposition to the environmentalist posture is not an an-
ti-environmentalist position. Indeed, the correct application of
the Takings Clause is designed to deter the government from
abusing its extraordinary power of requisition in socially de-
structive ways. When an individual wants to buy another indi-
vidual's resources, society requires him to pay the price. The
argument in favor of environmental action under the Takings
Clause is a generalization of Justice Stevens's position in Sweet
Home: Since society can coerce an owner, why in the world
does the taker have to pay him or her at all? But of course, the
correct posture is exactly the opposite. The moment an indi-
vidual gives somebody else the right to force an exchange for
public use, it is all the more important that the Takings
Clause's constraint of just compensation be respected in an in-
dividual case, lest the government consume everything and
anything in their path without any respect whatsoever to the
private values that are lost.4 0
38. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 702-03.
39. Id. at 703-04.
40. For the significance of the Takings Clause in this context, see, for example,
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
32 [Vol. 37
Environmentalists Overreach
To take yet another example, many people believe that it is
extremely important to have open air in the center of a large
city.41 To that request the proper response is: "Be my guest, so
long as you can get the citizens who benefit from this particular
open air to pony up sufficient funds to the owner of the land to
compensate for his loss," which is the value of the property
diminished by virtue of the regulation in question. If it turns
out that they are not prepared to pay that sum out of their own
revenues, then their claims are all cheap talk. The correct way
to approach such situations is the method used in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,4 2 where the trial court essentially
said that the state had actually taken the owner's land, so it is
proper for the court to require it to take the deed to the proper-
ty and pay the landowner $1,232,387.50 in exchange for the
land taken.43 Once the state owned the land, it could dedicate it
to a wide range of environmental purposes. Yet, what did the
defendants do? They looked at the impact on the budget, and
they realized that it was unwise to spend and keep land vacant
when they could use those dollars better to improve the beach.
So, they sold the thing off again to raise the money to achieve
proper public purposes." Incentives matter.
Compensation formulas force people to put their money
where their mouths are, and once that happens, they all blink
and then retreat. That said, the correct result is not that envi-
ronmentally concerned parties should back off in all cases, but
rather that they should figure out the ends that they want to
achieve so that they can buy the inputs needed to obtain them.
Thus, the most efficient form of environmental protection un-
der all of these circumstances is achieved through the protec-
tion and organization of private-property rights. At that point,
people will put more money towards public amenities that
they want; nobody wants to own a splendid mansion on a dirt-
41. The planning and development of New York's Central Park provides just
one example. See Elizabeth Blackmar & Roy Rosenzweig, History, CENTRAL PARK,
http://www.centralpark.com/guide/history.html.
42. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
43. Id. at 1009; see also Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (1993).
44. See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE
FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 288-89 (2005).
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filled road in a squalid city. As wealth begins to increase, envi-
ronmental protection will take place through the ordinary po-
litical processes of general taxation. There is no need to single
out certain targets in this overall process, under the definitions
of Pareto improvement and Pareto optimality discussed
above.45 Modern environmentalists, operating under a faulty
definition of "efficiency," like to suppose that there is some
other value outside of efficiency that has to be factored in.46 But
since efficiency is intended to capture the relevant preferences
of all individuals in society, the environmentalists offer no non-
mystical explanations on how to adjust the welfarist results to
take these unspecified values into account. Rather, these values
are said to operate as an undefined trump that sits there brood-
ing on high. When somebody starts to put forward some con-
crete proposal, it turns out to fit under the general theory.
There is no other workable framework out there. The con-
stant invocation of behavioral economics stuff 7 is essentially a
curlicue. It is important in certain cases dealing with adaptive
preferences in small group settings, but one reason why it took
so long to isolate that list of heuristics and biases48 is that their
effects are third-order issues compared to the power of self-
interest on the one hand and the risk of common errors due to
simple neglect, incompetence, or stupidity on the other, both of
which have been well understood for centuries.
II. PARTICULAR ABUSES IN MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Injunctions-When issued
One critical issue in all environmental disputes involves the
timing of public injunctions against potential private wrongs.
The appropriate comprehensive theory has to respond to the
challenge of when to introduce public force to enjoin behavior.
Discerning the proper time shows the power of the private-
45. See Pareto Optimality, supra note 18.
46. See, e.g., Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving: Police Power, Public Value, and Pri-
vate Right, 26 ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (1996).
47. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 316, 320 (2006).
48. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuris-
tics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974), an article of stupendous influence.
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public comparisons. If the common law got it right on efficien-
cy, then its rules aptly dictate how to deal with uncertain future
harms. The law always should wait for imminent peril before
enjoining, and then make sure there is a strong strict-liability
damage action after the effects so that people will step out of
harm's way before they get into trouble. 49 The problem with
the environmentalists is that they require all of these preclear-
ance permits at ridiculous levels so that we get the farce associ-
ated with Sackett v. EPA." In Sackett, the EPA sought to stop
construction on a supposed "wetland" that was separated from
the nearest body of water by several lots that had houses built
upon them.s" What possible reason is there to think that routine
construction posed any threat to any wetland, when it was per-
fectly apparent that any supposed threat could be dealt with
even after the Sacketts built their home in the ordinary way?
The bellicose government decision to seek an injunction would
be rebuffed instantly if sought by the owner of some private
lake. Yet under the current law, behavior that is unconsciona-
ble in the private sphere seems acceptable to government ac-
tors who regard themselves as wholly unconstrained by any
concerns with private property or with demonstrating the im-
minence of any potential harms. Further, there is no noneco-
nomic value that justifies the government beating up small
people by threatening them with overwhelming fines if they
dare challenge a government edict. The government action
from start to finish was ugly and odious and should be con-
demned by all people on all sides of any legitimate environ-
mental dispute.
49. See, e.g., Wis. Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 758 F.2d 669,
674 (D.C. Cir. 1985); John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information,
Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 271-72 (1991);
Robert L. Glicksman, Coal-Fired Power Plants, Greenhouse Gases, and State Statutory
Substantial Endangerment Provisions: Climate Change Comes to Kansas, 56 U. KAN. L.
REV. 517, 581 & n.374 (2008); Larry D. Silver, The Common Law of Environmental Risk
and Some Recent Applications, 10 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 61, 71-73, 75-77, 80-81 (1986).
50. 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
51. Id. at 1370.
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B. Knowledge versus Assumption of Risk
The second issue that is raised in these enforcement cases is
whether private knowledge that the government may act ag-
gressively should cabin the rights of ordinary people. I know
the standard joke runs, "I plan to go out in a public street. I'm
going to give everybody an announcement that I'm going to
beat them up. So now that you are aware, you assume the risk
of injury when you enter onto the public street. And lest any
one think that I am churlish or cheap I shall pay you $5.00 if
you are grievously hurt." These pronouncements are the tools
of an urban terrorist who by giving notice tells the world,
"Don't you do this because we'll do that." That same point ap-
plies to notice given by the government that it will restrict the
use of land by anyone who purchases it from its current own-
ers.5 2 When people have to buy land with notice that the gov-
ernment is going to restrict its development, the alienation
rights have effectively been killed.
The correct view in all of these cases is the common-law view
on privity:5 3 The assignee of the property takes whatever rights
the assignor of the property had to protect against that particu-
lar imposition. 54 He is neither better nor worse off than the as-
signor. That is a common-law rule that starts with contracts
and goes everywhere else. It is the efficient rule, it is the correct
rule, and it is a regime of terror for somebody to say, "We are
going to put environmental restrictions on it today. Anyone
that buys it tomorrow takes it subject to restrictions that did
not apply to the seller of the property."
C. Exactions
What else do the environmentalists do wrong? The recent
case of Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District55
comes to mind.56 That case tried to get around the notion that
52. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-30 (2001).
53. See, e.g., Smith v. Pickford, 85 F.2d 705, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Robert G. Natel-
son, Running with the Land in Montana, 51 MONT. L. REV. 17, 22-27, 31-33 (1990).
54. Smith, 85 F.2d at 709; Natelson, supra note 53, at 22-27, 31-33.
55. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
56. For my extensive discussion of the case, see Richard A. Epstein, The Takings
Clause and Partial Interests in Land: On Sharp Boundaries and Continuous Distribu-
tions, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 589 (2013).
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the state must pay for what it wants to take by inventing a very
large notion of "harm," and then announcing that some duty of
environmental mitigation shall be imposed upon all landown-
ers who have the temerity to want to build on their own land
without creating a nuisance to anybody.57 The performance on
every side of this particular argument was lamentably incom-
petent in terms of the way in which it was organized.
At the beginning of oral argument, Justice Sotomayor and
Justice Ginsburg asked bluntly if the plaintiff wished to chal-
lenge the doctrine of environmental mitigation,58 to which the
lawyer said no.5 9 That was the first mistake. What the lawyer
should have said is, "Yes, there is no more pernicious doctrine
in the entire armory of environmental law than that one be-
cause it upsets the proper relationship of private property to
the state." What is the danger in this case? It lies in the ad hoc
view that the government somehow owns an environmental
easement over all property, which it will waive only if private
individuals engage in acts of environmental mitigation.60 Sup-
pose the government wants to buy some land to preserve it as a
wetland. Normally, the cost goes to the general public budget.
Knowing that the payments have to come from the public
treasury, the state will tend to buy land that is not prime for
development but will instead choose more suitable lands locat-
ed in some relatively isolated place. That choice gives the state
more bang for its buck. But the moment the state can condition
permits on the willingness to devote cash or land to environ-
mental mitigation, we are back to the same broad definitions of
harm that worked so badly in Sweet Home. The state is now in a
position to coin money at will by simply announcing, like the
robber, "If you wish to build on this land, what you now have
to do is buy for us ten acres of land somewhere else which we
will put in perpetuity into a nature trust." How does the gov-
ernment, or for that matter the Court, decide that ten acres, five
acres, or two acres is the appropriate offset? How do you de-
57. Id. at 2592-94.
58. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, 6-7, Koontz, 133 S.Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1447).
59. Id. at 7.
60. See Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court's Mischievous Environmental Easement,
PoiNToFLAw.coM (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2013/02/
richard-epstein-the-supreme-courts-mischievous-environmental-easement.php.
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cide whether or not the particular environmental restrictions
have to be limited to the part in question, as the private indi-
viduals in Koontz argued,6 or whether or not you have to re-
pair some public infirmary or water bill or something else far
away from the premises?
There is no way in which anyone can decide these questions
at all. The environmentalists keep building up their position by
demanding ever stronger exactions. That is an absolute abuse
of government power, and it also leads to inefficient environ-
mental results. The correct test under the Takings Clause in any
and all cases runs as follows: Where the state wishes to place in
public solution land that is worth more to the public in its nat-
ural state than it is to a private developer, it can condemn the
land and create a Pareto improvement. But no such improve-
ment is attainable when the state says, "What you have to do is
to give this land worth X if you want to build." In response to
that mandate, the owner is forced to weigh the loss of devel-
opment rights against the amount of things that he has to sacri-
fice, which gives neither the government nor the public any
reliable measure of the relative values, private and social, of the
land in question. The right comparison is whether or not the
value of the land is greater in public than in private hands. The
only way the law achieves this end is to demand that the gov-
ernment unbundle the development rights from the exaction
and thereby insist that the state pay for what it wants. The
Koontz situation is another illustration of government cheap
talk; if the Management Board had to pay to take over these
development rights, it would have resorted to general tax rev-
enues to finance its purchase of the development rights.
III. CONCLUSION
The somber conclusion is that no one can park their
knowledge of sound common-law principles at the door if they
hope to get environmental law right. The overall analysis re-
quires creating institutional arrangements that call for the con-
stant comparison of the proposed gains from government ac-
tions with their losses. By that test, there is absolutely nothing
61. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 58, at 20-21.
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wrong with a version of the Takings Clause that insists that
government at all levels actually has to pay for land that it
wants to dedicate to wetlands or to any other purpose. In fact,
this is exactly the correct way of doing things because it forces
a democratic society to put these matters on budget. 62 This
would eliminate the amount of political entreaty, the endless
and pointless litigation that takes place, and the waste of re-
sources, which does nobody any kind of good. What is wrong
with the modern environmentalists is that their preoccupation
with ends makes them dreadful on matters of means, that is,
technique and social organization.
62. For one nice statement of this view, see Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ("The traditional manner in which American gov-
ernment has met the problem of those who cannot pay reasonable prices for privately
sold necessities-a problem caused by the society at large-has been the distribution
to such persons of funds raised from the public at large through taxes .... [Under the
Takings Clause,] this is the only manner that our Constitution permits.").
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